Current Issue
Vol.66・No.4
December, 2023
Adjustments in China’s Party-State Apparatus on Hong Kong Affairs after 2017: Implementing the Political Line via Organizational Measures
Chien-wen Kou ;Sheng-ya Lai
In its 19th National Congress report in October 2017, the Chinese Communist Party proposed “comprehensive jurisdiction” over Hong Kong and imposed “constitutional responsibility” on the Hong Kong government. What organizational and personnel adjustments have been made in China’s partystate apparatus on Hong Kong affairs since then? Although recent literature on Hong Kong has addressed changes in the regime’s Hong Kong policy, there is little systematic discussion of how the CCP implements its policies through institutional and personnel adjustments. This article aims to fill this gap.
The article finds that the CCP has adopted the organizational line of “strengthening centralized and unified leadership” to implement the new political line of “total control”. This organizational line is reflected in three trends: “strengthening the vertical chain of command”, “building a new national security system for Hong Kong”, and “weakening internal promotion considerations for personnel arrangements in Hong Kong-related departments”. As centralization of power is the most important feature of Chinese politics in the Xi Jinping era, what this article finds in the Hong Kong-related system reflects the CCP’s inertia in facing environmental challenges during Xi’s era.
Keywords:Hong Kong; one country, two systems; Central Leading Group on Hong Kong and Macau Affairs; Liaison Office in Hong Kong; Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office
Anti-Hegemony Discourse of the Chinese Communist Party: The New Era and The Tradition
Ziran Liang
As China’s capacity to invest abroad expands, so does the concern that China may be pushing countries into “debt traps,” particularly through various projects within the Belt and Road Initiative. However, the existing literature does not offer a consensus on whether China has indeed created “debt traps” in these countries. Moreover, large-scale empirical studies specifically addressing this issue have been notably absent. Hence, the primary objective of this article is to conduct an initial empirical examination of the relationship between “Chinese investment” and the concept of a “debt trap.” This will be based on the latest available debt data and a more precise definition of what constitutes a “debt trap.” The aim is to investigate whether there is a systematic and significant association between Chinese investment and the purported phenomenon of a “debt trap.” Drawing upon data from 180 countries worldwide spanning the years 2000 to 2017, it is evident that countries that have received greater Chinese investment tend to exhibit higher levels of debt owed to China, diminished debt repayment capacity, and closer alignment with China’s foreign policy interests. Additionally, they tend to experience lower rates of conflict and higher rates of cooperation with China in their bilateral relations. All of these empirical findings support the hypothesis that there is a substantial statistical correlation between “Chinese investment” and the concept of a “debt trap” at the state level of analysis. However, due to the absence of panel data, the direction of causality remains uncertain. Specifically, it is unclear whether these countries first exhibit these characteristics and subsequently receive investment and loans from China, leading to a “debt trap” phenomenon that is not intentionally caused by China. Conversely, it is possible that these countries receive investment and loans from China first, which subsequently results in them displaying these characteristics, suggesting a “debt trap” phenomenon that may be associated with China. A more thorough investigation of causality awaits the availability of panel data in the future.
Keywords:Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese Investment, Debt Trap, Solvency
【Research Note】Does Economic Development Influence the Decision-Making of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Regarding Appointments and Adjustments of Provincial-Level Party Standing Committee Members?
Wei-feng Tzeng
From 1949 to 1997, the Hong Kong Catholic Church and the British rulers of Hong Kong had established a close working relationship when the Church provided the required service to the society all the while to evangelize the people. In this period, the church and the state had established a harmonious working relationship in the model of the “proprietor vs contractor”.
In 1985, when the Sino-British announced that in 1997, Hong Kong would become the Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of China, Hong Kong Catholics believed that a democratic system would be the means to preserve religious freedom under the Communist rule. Therefore, the desire of political involvement among HK Catholics began to prevail in the transitional period (1985~1997) before the Chinese rule on Hong Kong.
Meanwhile, the Catholic Church in the Mainland China began to revive to a certain degree after the destruction in Mao’s Era. HK Catholic played the role in the bridging endeavor to assist the revival of the Chinese Church. Thus, since 1997, the paradigm of the church-state relations of Hong Kong Catholic with the local government, with Beijing and with the Vatican began to shift from harmonious relations to complicated and confrontational relations. Due to the confrontational strategy that was represented by the prophetic leader, Bishop Joseph Zen Zi-kiun (new position as Cardinal in 2006), Xi Jinping began to gradually tighten Hong Kong’s religious freedom. This caused their relations to be at the worst in 2019. However, the church-state relations became better and reached a turning point when Bishop Stephen Chow Sau-Yen appeared, who was from the Jesuit order. As such, during this period, the development of the Church-state relationship in HKSAR has been experiencing dramatic changes with the shift of paradigms.
Keywords:Hong Kong Catholic Church, Church-State Relations, Paradigm Shift, Joseph Cardinal Zen Zi-kiun, Stephen Cardinal Chow Sau-yen
【Research Note】Transformation of the Mainland Chinese Media in the Digital Age: A Study on the Media Think-Tanks
Haiyan Wang ;Jianchao Huang
The sociology of knowledge emphasizes that in exploring the production of knowledge, one must deeply understand the external factors that affect the nature of knowledge. In the past, the development of Chinese studies in South Korea was influenced by external factors such as the “Cold War.” Before the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China, Chinese studies in South Korea were mainly dominated by the US-trained group and Taiwan-trained group. However, with the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China, the number of South Korean students pursuing doctoral degrees in China gradually increased, forming a new academic community known as the China-trained group. The China-trained group has an absolute majority in terms of quantity in South Korea’s Chinese studies, and currently dominates the field. However, there is still insufficient research on them. This article will focus on the China-trained group as the research object and examine their current situation and research methods in detail, in order to gain a deeper understanding of their position in South Korea’s Chinese studies. The majority of the China-trained group obtained their doctoral degrees from Peking University. This may have an impact on Korean research on China, including facilitating a deeper understanding of Chinese society and politics, but it may also limit research diversity. In addition, with the rise of China, the demand for China’s regional research in Korea has been continuously increasing. Consequently, the role of the China-trained group faction in Korea’s foreign policy has become increasingly significant. In terms of research methods, compared to other academic communities, the China-trained group who received education in China not only has a significant advantage in Chinese language, history, culture, economy, society, and politics but has also established extensive interpersonal relationships in China, thus obtaining empirical research results. The China-trained group, while having sufficient academic resources and interpersonal networks to contribute to Korean research on China, is also often perceived as Pro-China. However, within the China-trained group, there are diverse positions and perspectives on China’s issues. As such, they should not be considered as a homogeneous academic community with only one viewpoint or position. Currently, there is widespread anger towards China in Korean society, especially after the THAAD dispute and economic sanctions. Lastly, the China-trained group has the responsibility to approach China’s issues with academic expertise and research ethics, adopting on objective and empirical attitude, and considering ways to bridge the gap between national interests and public antipathy.
Keywords:The Sociology of Knowledge, China Studies in Korea, The China-Trained Group, Methodology