Current Issue
Vol.69 No. 2
June, 2026
Elite Recruitment in the CCP’s 21th Party Congress: Mobility, Structural Change, and Political Challenges
Te-sheng Chen ；Shinn-shyr Wang
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) convened its 20th National Congress in October 2022, during which 205 members were elected to the Central Committee, forming a new cohort of political elites responsible for state governance. In addition to the 24 members of the Politburo, who occupy core and influential positions, the career advancement and appointment of the remaining members depend on specific criteria. Identifying these conditions and assessing which individuals possess greater political potential constitute the central focus of this study.
Drawing on theories and literature related to authoritarian regimes, trust networks, and elite politics, this paper examines the mechanisms of elite selection and operation during the Xi Jinping era. Furthermore, it employs multiple regression analysis to explore the conditions, trends, and potential candidates for future elite recruitment. The study aims to provide predictions and evaluations regarding the selection, promotion, and attrition of CCP political elites.
The findings indicate that Xi’s personal networks, along with trust, loyalty, competence, integrity, and professionalism, remain the key criteria for elite selection. Under flexible age norms among top elites, political considerations may override the conventional “seven up, eight down” retirement rule in the composition of the 21st Politburo, accompanied by deliberate generational arrangements. Moreover, the Party, economic and financial sectors, the military, as well as political-legal and security domains continue to be priority areas under Xi’s control. In addition, the expansion of elite recruitment through “indirect trust networks” is likely to become an emerging trend.
Keywords:20th National Congress, Central Committee, Indirect Trust Networks, Elite Recruitment, Multiple Regression Analysis
From Ethnic China to Cultural China: Shifts in CCP United Front Strategy Through Infinity and Beyond: Treasure Island Season
Yu-hui Tai
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has long mobilized bloodline-based narratives of shared ethnic origin to produce pro-unification songs. Such efforts have consistently backfired, however, generating a corpus of parodic and resistant counter-texts. Departing from this “bloodline China” approach, Hunan Satellite Television launched Infinity and Beyond (2022~present), a five-season music variety program that frames Chinese culture as a shared heritage uniting mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the global Chinese diaspora, while positioning Taiwanese popular music as a flagship representative of the “Chinese Wave.” This article presents a case study of the “Treasure Island Season” to examine how this new strategy attempts to displace Taiwan’s entrenched aversion toward pro-unification cultural productions and to elicit a broader emotional spectrum—ranging from hostility to affection.
The study advances two principal arguments. First, it identifies an emergent shift in CCP united-front strategy: alongside the discourse of “bloodline China,” a “Cultural China” approach has taken shape—one that appeals to cultural sentiment rather than ethnic kinship and warrants attention as a new manifestation of authoritarian resilience. Second, it accounts for the
persuasive potential of this strategy through three interlocking mechanisms: (1) music’s distinctive capacity to activate collective and autobiographical memory, enabling audiences to anchor iconic Taiwanese songs to personal experience and thereby deepen identification with the program; (2) the dispersal of political messaging across variety-show segments, which dilutes its ideological visibility; and (3) the program’s simulation of the Golden Melody Awards under the guise of tribute, through which a Party-curated canon of Taiwanese popular music is assembled. Although framed as homage, song selection is determined unilaterally by Party priorities, confining Taiwanese music to the category of “Mandarin music with Taiwanese characteristics” and systematically excluding works that engage social critique or articulate Taiwan-centered consciousness. Disseminated across digital platforms, this Party-curated canon enters the collective memory database and intervenes in the ongoing struggle over the interpretive authority of cultural history.
Keywords:Popular Music, Memory Politics, United Front, Variety Shows, Cross-Strait Relations
World Revolution, Bloc Division, and Strategic Shift: A Re-Examination of the Driving Structure of China’s Third Front Construction Decision (1962~1966)
Bu-qing Yang
The 1960s are widely considered a period of political and social upheaval worldwide. In this era, Mao Zedong’s theory of revolutionary struggle, as a global revolutionary theory of the 1960s, resonated widely among radical left-wing intellectuals in Asia, Latin America, Africa, Western Europe, and North America. From the mid-1960s onward, Mao Zedong significantly revised his views on the domestic and international situation in China. He believed that Asia, Africa, and Latin America were the main sources of the world revolutionary storm, and that a world revolution was on the horizon. Under these circumstances, he became increasingly dissatisfied with continuing the step-by-step adjustment of the national economy domestically. The intertwined domestic contradictions and the favorable international revolutionary situation constituted the historical cause of Mao Zedong’s decision to establish the Third Front in 1964. From a broader perspective, in Mao Zedong’s overall strategic vision, the Third Front construction primarily served the grand blueprint of world revolution, its importance far exceeding that of the Vietnam War or the Sino-Soviet border issue. Simultaneously, the leadership of the world revolution must be held by a class that is constantly being purified in a dynamic process. Therefore, the Third Front construction was not only a “national defense” against external threats, but also a “political defense” and social reconstruction against potential internal crises. Ultimately, the shift in the Third Front construction from initially preparing for world revolution to later preventing revisionist tendencies within the Party foreshadowed the inevitable radicalization of the Chinese revolution.
Keywords:Sino-Soviet Relations, World Revolution, Third-Line Const ruct ion, Mao Zedong, Combat and Prevent Revisionism
Book Review: Carter, Erin Baggott, and Carter, Brett L. (2023). Propaganda in Autocracies: Institutions, Information, and the Politics of Belief. Cambridge University Press.
Shane Hsuan-yu Lin